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 Internal Conflict, the International Community and the Promotion of Principled 
Compromise 
 
Peter Jones, Newcastle University, UK 
Ian O’Flynn, Newcastle University, UK 
 
Abstract 
 
The international community has many reasons to promote compromise between the 
parties to internal conflicts.  Yet to do so effectively, the international community ought 
to treat principled rather than  strategic compromise as its default position.   To make this 
case, we begin by defining „compromise‟ and by distinguishing principled from  strategic 
compromise.  We then defend the idea of principled compromise against the realist  who 
thinks that that idea is implausible.  We conclude by offering a number of practical 
reasons why principled compromise ought to be preferred.  Our argument does not deny 
that strategic  compromise will sometimes be the only option.  But, unlike principled 
compromise, strategic  compromise does not provide the parties with any particular 
reason to look beyond their own particular concerns or to give any ground beyond what is 
absolutely necessary.   
 
The international community has many reasons to be concerned about the growing 
number of internal conflicts worldwide.
1
  Especially where ethnicity or religion is 
involved, those conflicts can be extremely violent and involve tremendous suffering.  But 
even where internal conflicts are relatively peaceful, they still threaten to destabilise the 
international system.  Some internal conflicts involve demands for territorial autonomy or 
secession which, for better or worse, call the prevailing international order directly into 
question.  Others risk turning into regional conflicts, as neighbouring states seek to 
protect their ethnic kith-and-kin across the border or strive to ensure that rival states do 
not gain influence or access to resources that they might secure for themselves.  In recent 
years, internal conflict has also become closely linked to such things as the international 
                                                 
1
 According to the Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research, there were 
363 conflicts worldwide in 2010.  Of those, 269 were internal conflicts, 32 of which 
involved high, sustained levels of violence.  For a detailed analysis of global trends since 
1945, see http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2010.pdf.  
Accessed 2 August 2011. 
 2 
drugs trade, piracy and, perhaps most dramatically of all, the rise of international 
terrorism. 
 
Internal conflicts are extremely difficult to manage, let alone resolve.  The basic reason is 
obvious enough: conflict breeds mutual suspicion and mistrust, which makes it very hard 
to compromise.  But even when the parties to a conflict have accepted the need for 
compromise, they will often find it very difficult to view the concessions they have to 
make from anything other than their own perspective.  Of course, someone might say that 
there is nothing wrong with seeking the best deal possible for oneself or conceding only 
what is absolutely necessary.  Yet if mutual suspicion and mistrust are eventually to be 
overcome, the parties must develop a more mature sense of responsibility for their 
actions, including a greater willingness to reflect on and take into account the 
consequences of those actions for other parties. 
 
In this article, we argue that, wherever possible, the international community should seek 
to promote compromises that start from common ground, and in particular from shared 
political principles.  Typically, the parties to a compromise have something to gain from 
it, and it is the prospect of that gain that induces them to compromise.  But, in 
compromising, each side still pays a price for the gain that it would prefer not to pay.  
More often than not, that price will turn out to be far higher than each thought it would be 
on entering into the process.
2
  Yet in so far as the parties can collectively say that the 
concessions they have made were governed by shared political principles, they may also 
be able to convince enough people from all sides that those concessions are worth 
making—not just as a matter of strategic necessity but because they are fair or just. 
 
A compromise is strategic if, in the eyes of each of the compromising parties, its merit 
consists only in its promoting that party‟s interests or ends.  A compromise is principled 
if the parties conceive it as possessing a desirable moral quality as a compromise, as well 
                                                 
2
 Bernard Crick, (1990) „The High Price of Peace‟, History Today, 40: 10 (1990), pp. 7-9, 
at pp. 7-8. 
 3 
as promoting their own purposes.
3
 They might, for example, conceive the compromise as 
just or fair or reasonable or, no less importantly, as not unjust or not unfair or not 
unreasonable.  They might do so with respect either to the substance of the compromise 
or to the process through which it has been agreed. 
 
We begin by defining compromise generally and by developing the distinction  between  
strategic and principled compromises.  We then take up the challenge of showing not just 
that principled compromise is a plausible goal for the parties to an internal conflict to 
pursue, but also why it is desirable for them to do so.  In particular and other things being 
equal, a compromise that is principled is likely to be more stable or enduring than one 
that is merely  strategic.  Our argument does not deny that strategic compromise will 
sometimes be the only option.  But strategic compromise does not provide the parties 
with any reason to look beyond their own concerns or to give any ground beyond what is 
absolutely necessary.  Principled compromise may be more difficult to achieve or may be 
the more risky strategy.  But the benefits of principled compromise can make that risk 
worth taking. 
 
What is a compromise? 
 
The need for compromise arises only when there is conflict.  If there is no conflict, there 
is no occasion for compromise.  The conflict can be grounded in different preferences, 
interests, principles, beliefs or judgements which can be bound up with different 
identities or different national, ethnic or religious commitments.  This is not to say that 
every conflict can or should be resolved through compromising—most writers on 
compromise agree that there are moral limits to compromise.
4
  Although specifying the 
exact nature of those limits is not our concern in this article, the international community 
                                                 
3
 According to Brian Barry, something is in my interest if it helps me to get what I want. 
Yet while I might want a compromise that was fair or just, I could also want a 
compromise that was simply good for me. See Brian Barry, Political Argument, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990 [1965]. 
4
 E.g., Avishai Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2009, p. 67 and passim. 
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might reasonably refuse to recognise or broker a compromise that violated human rights 
standards or transgressed international law.   
 
For there to be a compromise, the parties must think that there is more to be gained from 
compromising than not compromising.  Yet although the parties compromise to achieve a 
goal, the goal they pursue may or may not be the same.  If, for example, two parties have 
been engaged in ethnic warfare, the goal they seek through compromise may be the same: 
lasting peace and the fruits of peace.  Alternatively, the parties may seek different goals.  
One party may enter the compromise in pursuit of a lasting peace, while the other may do 
so only as a temporary expedient that will enable it to remarshal its troops, build up its 
weaponry, and return to war with a better chance of victory.  Yet whatever the case, the 
point remains that unless the parties have something significant to gain from a 
compromise, they will have no reason for wanting to compromise. 
 
For there to be a compromise, then, there must be a conflict and the parties to that 
conflict must have good reason to compromise.
5
  But what exactly is a compromise?   
   
(a) Two or more parties 
 
A compromise has to be made between two or more parties.  The parties can be 
individual persons, groups, associations or institutions.  That simple condition is not 
entirely uncontroversial.  We sometimes speak as if compromise were intrapersonal, as, 
for example, when we say a political leader has  „compromised‟ his principles.6  
„Compromise‟ might also be used to describe trade-offs of values, even though the 
                                                 
5
 One could contemplate a situation where the international community thinks that the 
parties should want to compromise, even though they do not wish to do so (possibly the 
Taliban in Afghanistan); but, for the purposes of this article, we are only concerned with 
situations in which there is already some motivation to compromise, and the issue is what 
form the compromise takes.   
6
 Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and 
Politics, Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 1990. 
 5 
relevant conflict is amongst values rather than valuers.
7
  We treat these intrapersonal or 
impersonal notions of compromise as figurative and parasitic upon the standard notion of 
compromise as an inter-personal or inter-party matter.
8
 
 
(b) Engaged in by the parties themselves  
 
A compromise is something reached by those who are party to it.  A compromise is not a 
solution imposed by a third party.
9
  When a third party divides the spoils between two 
conflicting parties and imposes that division upon them, people sometimes describe that 
as an „imposed compromise‟.  But that usage departs from the ordinary idea of 
compromise—we would not normally describe something as a compromise unless it 
emerged from a compromise process in which the parties themselves were involved.
10
  
This involvement may take the form of protracted discussion or negotiation or it may be 
little short of instantaneous.  Either way, a compromise is not merely a special sort of 
outcome, but also a special sort of process—one in which the compromisers or their 
representatives must participate for it to be recognisable as a compromise.
11
 
 
(c) All parties make concessions 
 
                                                 
7
 Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise, 
London, Routledge, 1999. 
8
 But see Chiara Lepora, „On Compromise and Being Compromised‟, Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 20:1 (2012), pp. 1-22. 
9
 Theodore Benditt, „Compromising Interests and Principles‟, in J. Roland Pennock and 
John W. Chapman (eds), NOMOS XXI: Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics, New 
York, New York University Press, 1979, pp. 26-37, at p. 30. 
10
 Arthur Kuflik, „Morality and Compromise‟, in Pennock and Chapman (eds), pp. 38-65, 
at pp. 39-40. 
11
 This point is easily overlooked.  E.g., Sumantra Bose describes the Dayton Peace 
Accords as a „strategic compromise‟.  Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist 
Partition and International Intervention, London, Hurst, 2002, p. 53.  Yet this is not 
accurate since its provisions were largely dictated by Richard Holbrooke and his team.  
What is more, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats had no direct representation of their 
own; nor was the agreement ever put to a referendum. 
 6 
A compromise is a compromise only if all the parties to it give ground.  Capitulation can 
be unilateral but compromise cannot.  The concessions made by the parties do not have to 
be equal and that raises the awkward question of just how asymmetrical a compromise 
can be and remain a compromise.
12
  The parties might agree that mutual concessions 
need to be made.  But if one party is all but compelled to accept the outcome, would we 
class that outcome as a compromise?  Would it make a difference if later the party puts 
aside its reservations and fully endorses the outcome?  But, setting aside cases of this 
sort, it is essential to the idea of a compromise that all parties to it make concessions. 
 
(d) A compromise is agreed to 
 
A compromise is something that the parties „make‟ or „agree to‟ or „enter into‟.  To be a 
party to a compromise is to have entered into, and to have assumed, a commitment.  In 
that respect, compromises are like promises.  Indeed, J. Patrick Dobel describes them as 
„co-promises‟.13  Thus, the reason for adhering to a compromise, like the reason for 
keeping a promise, is not reducible to the reasons for making it.  That is important since 
people are sometimes inclined to think of a compromise as a mere balance of advantage, 
which each party has reason to adhere to only so long as they continue to find it 
advantageous.
14
  But, even in the case of purely strategic compromise, the reasons why a 
party should adhere to the compromise are not wholly reducible to a calculus of the costs 
and benefits delivered by the compromise, which is not to deny that, in reality, nothing 
but that calculus may determine whether the party actually adheres to the compromise.
15
 
 
(e) Compromise occasions regret 
 
                                                 
12
 For discussions, see Benditt, „Compromising Interests and Principles‟, pp. 28-30; 
Margalit, On Compromise, pp. 53-54. 
13
 J. Patrick Dobel, Compromise and Political Action: Political Morality in Liberal and 
Democratic Life, Savage, Rowman and Littlefield, 1990, pp. 3, 35. 
14
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 
146-147. 
15
 On this point, see further Peter Jones and Ian O‟Flynn, „Can a Compromise be Fair?‟, 
Politics, Philosophy and Economics, (forthcoming). 
 7 
To say that a compromise is something that is agreed to is not to say that compromise 
occasions no regret.  On the contrary, as Richard Bellamy argues, compromisers „must 
endorse a package many of the components of which they would reject if taken in 
isolation.  Though they consider the agreement as the most acceptable to all concerned, 
each retains his or her own view of what is best‟.16  The fact that compromise involves 
mutual concessions means that each party must settle for less than what it considers to be 
ideal—where „less‟ may mean a smaller portion of what it wants, fewer elements of its 
preferred outcome, less desirable means of implementation, adoption on a smaller scale, 
or combination with other irrelevant or less desirable elements.
17
  
 
(f) Compromising and bargaining 
 
Some writers distinguish compromises from bargains.
18
  But treating compromises and 
bargains as mutually exclusive departs radically from ordinary usage.  For instance, if the 
leaders of different ethnic, national or religious factions engage in bargaining over the 
distribution of ministerial portfolios in a power-sharing coalition, it would be quite 
normal to describe the result of their negotiations as a compromise even though it is 
entirely a product of bargaining.  The very idea of „negotiating‟ a compromise implies an 
element of bargaining.  However, while a compromise can be the outcome of bargaining 
and therefore be a „bargain‟, not all compromises warrant that description.  In particular, 
if the parties to a conflict seek a fair accommodation of their different wishes and if they 
deliberate, rather than negotiate, their way to a result, that result will be a compromise but 
not a bargain. 
 
Principled and strategic compromises 
                                                 
16
 Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, p. 102. 
17
 Dennis F. Thompson, „Mill in Parliament: When should a Philosopher Compromise?‟, 
in Nadia Urbinati and Alex Zakaras (eds), J.S. Mill’s Political Thought: A Bicentennial 
Reassessment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 166-199, at p. 168. 
18
 Benditt, „Compromising Interests and Principles‟; John E. Coons, „Compromise as 
Precise Justice‟, in Pennock and Chapman (eds), pp. 190-204; Andrew Lister, „Public 
Reason and Moral Compromise‟, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 37: 1 (2007), pp. 1-
34. 
 8 
 
As we shall use it, the distinction between principled and strategic compromise relates to 
the make-up of a compromise.  A compromise is „strategic‟ to the extent that the parties 
concede only what they need concede to secure the compromise.  Their approach is 
purely instrumental: „what is the minimum we need to concede to secure the most 
advantageous compromise we can obtain?‟  As we indicated earlier, the goals sought by 
the parties to a compromise can be the same or different.  But the point remains that, 
insofar as a compromise is strategic, its content will reflect what each party believed it 
had to concede to secure the pay-off it sought.  
 
In the case of „principled‟ compromise, by contrast, the parties are guided by norms they 
think should govern their compromise.  Those norms can be of two types.  They may be 
substantive; that is, they may relate to the content of the compromise.
19
   For example, the 
parties might accept that whatever compromise they agree to should accord an equal 
status to all who are to be governed by it.  Alternatively, they may be procedural; they 
may govern the process through which the compromise is negotiated and agreed to.  For 
example, the parties might accept certain principles of procedural fairness such as each 
party‟s having an equal status in the compromising process.20  Accordingly, it is possible 
for the international community to admonish the parties to recognise principles that 
should govern the compromising procedure, without being prescriptive in a heavy handed 
way about the content of the compromise. 
 
A compromise may be partially rather than wholly principled: it may be principled in 
some of its aspects and strategic in others.
21
  But, even when a compromise is only 
partially principled, its containing some element of principle may make a difference to 
how the parties and others regard it and to its stability and durability, as we argue below.   
 
                                                 
19
 Cf. Benjamin, Splitting the Difference, pp. 4-8. 
20
 On the relationship between fairness and compromise, see Jones and O‟Flynn, „Can a 
Compromise be Fair?‟. 
21
 Alain Noël, „Democratic Deliberation in a Multinational Federation‟, Critical Review 
of International Social and Political Philosophy, 9: 3 (2006), pp. 419-444, at p. 433. 
 9 
In general, a compromise will be principled only to the extent that the parties strive that it 
should be so.  It is logically possible that a compromise will comply with a principle with 
which, the international community believes, it should comply, even though none of the 
parties to the compromise was guided by it.  For example, two parties who have roughly 
equal bargaining strengths and equal interests in a conflict may arrive at a compromise 
that divides the spoils equally between them. That equal division may be precisely what, 
the international community believes, fairness demands.  Yet,  in negotiating the 
compromise, each party may have ignored considerations of fairness and aimed only to 
maximise its own advantage.  However, this sort of fortuitous moral outcome is likely to 
be very much the exception.  If the parties approach a compromise as an exercise in pure 
bargaining, their compromise can be relied upon to manifest nothing more than their 
relative bargaining strengths.  A principled compromise is likely to emerge only from a 
compromising process that has been guided by principle.  Hence, if we believe that a 
conflict ought to be resolved through principled compromise, we should seek to persuade 
the compromising parties to think likewise. 
 
There are other ways in which the labels „principled‟ and „pragmatic‟ might be applied to 
compromise that differ from our usage here.  They might be used to describe the goals 
people seek through compromise.  If a party seeks only its own advantage, we might 
describe its approach to compromise as merely strategic.  If it seeks a more selfless, 
moral goal—if, for example, it aims to reduce human suffering—we might describe its 
approach as principled.  However, a compromise that is motivated by a moral goal will 
still be, in our terms, „strategic‟ insofar as the concessions the parties make are motivated 
by  instrumental considerations; that is, insofar as each party concedes only what it 
(believes it) has to concede to the secure the moral goal. 
 
Alternatively, we might describe any goal-based compromise as „strategic‟ and reserve 
the term „principled‟ for cases in which people believe they should compromise as a 
 10 
matter of principle.
22
  In this usage, someone might seek a principled compromise 
because he believes, for example, that his disagreement with others is a „reasonable 
disagreement‟ and that fairness requires that he concede something to the reasonable 
views of others even though he believes them to be mistaken.  Here there is a degree of 
overlap with our usage in that, if someone believes he should compromise as a matter of 
principle, he will (or should) be guided by that principle in the sort of compromise he 
seeks.  However, in our usage, someone who enters into compromise for purely goal-
based reasons might still seek a principled compromise—a compromise whose 
negotiation or content is governed by considerations of principle. 
 
Finally, „principled‟ and „strategic‟ might be used to describe the conflict that is subject 
to compromise.  A compromise might be described as „principled‟ if it addresses a 
conflict of principle, and as „strategic‟ if it addresses a conflict of interest or preference.  
In our terms, there may be scope for „principled‟ compromise of a principled conflict.23 
But a conflict over principles might be equally susceptible to purely strategic 
compromise.  Similarly, while a conflict of interest or preference might be resolved 
through strategic compromise, it might also be eligible for principled compromise.  
Indeed, the idea of „fair compromise‟ applies much more readily to conflicts of interest or 
preference than to conflicts of principle.
24
   
 
To sum up, then, a compromise is „strategic‟ insofar as the parties think in a purely goal-
based, self-interested way about the concessions they should make, whereas a 
compromise is „principled‟ insofar as the process or the outcome is shaped by, for 
example, considerations of fairness.  Before considering which of these sorts of 
compromise we should prefer and why, we need to address a number of possible 
objections. 
                                                 
22
 Simon May, „Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy‟, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 33: 4 (2005), pp. 317-348.  Although May draws the distinction in this 
way, he doubts whether „principled compromise‟ is a plausible notion.  
23
 George Sher, „Subsidised Abortion: Moral Rights and Compromise‟, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 1: 4 (1984), pp. 361-372, at p. 369.  But see Lister, „Public Reason and 
Moral Compromise‟, p. 18. 
24
 Benditt, „Compromising Interests and Principles‟, p. 31. 
 11 
 
Is principled compromise plausible? 
 
As we indicated in our introductory remarks, the burden of this article is to argue that the 
international community should seek to promote principled compromises in cases of 
internal conflict.  This is not to suggest that strategic compromise should never be 
pursued; strategic compromise may sometimes be the only option.  Nevertheless, as we 
will shortly argue, there are good reasons why the international community should treat 
principled compromise as its default position.  First, though, there are number of 
theoretical and practical objections to contend with.    
 
A „realist‟ might object that „principled compromise‟ is all well and good in theory but, in 
the real world, compromise is about power and interests.  Suppose the parties to an 
internal conflict disagree about how oil revenues are to be distributed (e.g., Iraq) or about 
the rate of fiscal transfers from one segment of the country to another (e.g., Belgium).  
Since each adheres to a different distributive principle, and since those principles may be 
uncombinable, the principle on which they finally agree may itself have to be the product 
of compromise.  So, rather than the principle shaping the compromise, it may be the 
compromise that shapes the principle.
25
  In other words, the compromise may be more 
fundamental than the principle. 
 
On the face of it, this objection might be thought to undermine the claim that the 
international community should promote principled compromises: principles cannot help 
to sustain a compromise if they are themselves based on compromise.  There are, 
however, several things that can be said in response.  While a conflict between two 
parties might be rooted in uncombinable principles, there might, as we indicated earlier, 
be a principle that both parties accept independently of that conflict.  Two parties might 
have conflicting views about the role of religion in public life (e.g., Lebanon).  But at the 
same time they might both accept that they are of equal status and that, in principle, there 
is no reason why the wish of one should count for more than the wish of the other.  So, 
                                                 
25
 Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, pp. 93-114. 
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although there is a conflict which will require compromise, there is also a principle that 
might shape that compromise.  In that case, strategic compromise will not be the only 
option. 
 
Still, the realist may remain unconvinced.  The parties to a conflict can „accept‟ a 
principle in two different ways.  For example, they might simply accept that everyone has 
certain basic rights, so that they have an obligation to respect those rights independently 
of their own consent.  In that case, the principle does not govern the compromise only if 
and because the parties agree to it.  Alternatively, they might think that their obligation in 
respect of the principle derives not from the principle itself but from their consent to it.  
They might think that while rights are vitally important, they need to be worked up 
pragmatically through the democratic process.
26
  In that case, they will think that the 
principle applies to them only if and because they agree to it. 
 
The realist will think that the second is the more likely of the two: if the parties accept 
that everyone has certain basic rights and that those rights should govern or constrain 
decisions about how resources should be distributed, why, or so the realist might 
rhetorical say, did the conflict break out in the first place?  As William Zartman‟s 
analysis of the Namibian conflict suggests, sometimes the parties need reminding by the 
international community that they already share basic principles; reminding the parties 
that this was so was decisive in allowing the negotiations to move forward.
27
  Yet even if 
it is the case that the parties think that a principle applies to them only if and because they 
have consented to it, their acceptance of the principle is still unlikely to be a matter of 
mere (i.e., strategic) consent.  When a party agrees to a principle‟s governing a 
compromise process, that is tantamount to its agreeing that the principle should govern 
the process.  In other words, it is tantamount to the party‟s accepting a principle as the 
right principle for the task.  So, even if we agree with the realist that the parties‟ 
accepting a principle will itself be part of the compromise process, that does not render 
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 Ibid., pp. 95, 103. 
27
 I. William Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays on Theory and 
Practice, London, Routledge,2008, pp. 82-99. 
 13 
the principle redundant as a „principle‟.  On the contrary, their accepting the principle as 
a principle that should govern the compromising process is still enough to make the 
compromise principled rather than merely strategic.  The relevant consideration here is 
that they have reason to accept that there is something „right‟ or „fair‟ or „reasonable‟ 
about the compromise, because of the principle that now governs it; it is more than a 
mere bargain inspired only by the self-interest of the parties.
28
 
 
At this point, someone else might object that, in asking the parties to take a principled 
approach, the international community is really asking them to recognise the error of their 
ways.  A principle of fairness may give each of the parties reason to make concessions to 
the other side.  It may also give each of them reason to see that its starting position was 
not as fair as it should have been and that it needs to be revised.  But if principled 
compromise is the same as moral correction, the concessions that the parties make are not 
really concessions at all—the parties are really changing, by revising, the starting 
positions from which they seek to compromise.  At the limit, the parties could revise their 
positions to a point at which they cease to be in conflict, so that nothing is left over which 
they can compromise.  In this vein, Simon May argues that the „good thing about the final 
positions has nothing to do with the fact that they emerged as moral compromises, and 
everything to do with the independent fact that they are simply the best positions [after 
moral correction]‟.29 
 
The objection here is not merely theoretical, but has important practical implications.  If 
principled compromise is identified with moral correction, there may be little point in 
seeking to manage or resolve internal conflicts on such terms.  For example, the 
international community might think that Israel is wrong not to withdraw from the 
                                                 
28
 In discussing the equivalence principle that governed the details of the agreement on 
Namibian independence, Zartman writes that the „formula was not merely based on 
“getting something” in exchange for independence but rather a matched and balanced-
trade off that provided a guide for further details‟.  Ibid., p. 90.  The language of „a 
matched and balanced-trade off‟ is unhelpful here, since the point Zartman seeks to make 
is that the equivalence principle ensured that the compromise it guided was not reducible 
to a mere strategic compromise.   
29
 May, „Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy‟, p. 319. 
 14 
occupied Palestinian territories.  Yet no Israeli leader enters into a negotiation process 
seeking moral correction on this basic point.  Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to 
say that no leader anywhere goes into a negotiation process thinking that the cause for 
which so much was sacrificed could have be morally ill-conceived.  Even if they did 
think this, it is doubtful whether they could ever say so publicly.
30
   
 
Principled compromise is not, however, the same as moral correction.
31
 While there may 
be an element of moral correction during a negotiation process, principled compromise is 
an activity distinct from moral correction.  Following Arthur Kuflik, we can distinguish 
between „(1) what one judges ought to be done about a matter that happens to be in 
dispute, leaving aside any consideration of the fact that there is a dispute; (2) what one 
judges ought to be done, all things considered‟.32  Each of the parties to an internal 
conflict will have its own view about how that conflict ought to be resolved (e.g., British 
unionists think that Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom, whereas 
Irish nationalists think that Northern Ireland should be united with Ireland).  But the 
parties might still accept that, for now at least, conditions on the ground are such that it is 
only right or fair to compromise (and so that acceptance helps both British unionists and 
Irish nationalists to build a principled compromise that gives both sides some of what 
they want but neither side all of what it wants).   
 
In such cases, the principle that informs and governs the compromise provides each of 
the parties with a second-order reason for compromise that pushes their first-order 
                                                 
30
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commitments to one side.
33
  But those first-order commitments do not disappear and the 
compromise will fall short of what they really want.  As we said earlier, since the parties 
must settle now for less than the ideal, moral compromise occasions regret in a way that 
moral correction does not. 
 
Why promote principled compromise? 
 
A compromise can look very different, or perform very differently, depending on whether 
the parties are guided by considerations of principle or by their assessment of what is 
strategically necessary to achieve their goals.  Sometimes, adopting a principled approach 
will inhibit compromise because the conflict is one of principle and the parties need to be 
induced to think more pragmatically.  Yet at other times, it might be possible to get the 
parties to think about different sorts of principle—principles about conflict resolution, 
including the resolution of conflicts of principle—rather than only thinking about the 
principles on which they disagree.  Careful judgement is required to decide which 
response is the right or most appropriate response.  Making the right choice at the right 
time can be crucial to ensuring that a compromise will embed.  Yet there are still good 
reasons why the international community should encourage the parties to a conflict to 
treat principled compromise as their first port of call. 
 
The comparative study of internal conflicts is largely concerned with the question of 
political stability.  The distinction between strategic and principled compromise bears 
directly on this question.  In a strategic compromise, each party will ask itself what it 
needs to do to achieve a stipulated goal.  Yet there is no particular reason why its 
assessment of the concessions that it will need to make should be driven by anything 
other than its own concerns.  The party will need to factor information about the other 
side into its calculations in order to decide how much or little it will have to concede, but 
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there is no attempt here to proceed from common ground.
34
  As a result, the party has no 
opportunity of saying both to its own supporters and to the other side that the 
compromise is good for everyone.  The international community might try to ensure that 
the compromise that results is mutually advantageous, but, as we have already said, the 
prevailing balance of power will inevitably influence the concessions that are made.  
Since the balance of power is often subject to change, compromises built in this way may 
be unstable. 
 
By contrast, the fact that a principled compromise proceeds from common ground means 
that it may have a better chance of standing the test of time.  Of course, someone might 
say that the principles that underpin a principled compromise need not be the same for all 
the parties to the compromise, which could foster instability over time—the different 
parties may think in terms of „our‟ principles versus „theirs‟.  But this seems very 
unlikely since it is hard to see how quite different principles would converge on the same 
outcome.  A compromise may be guided by more than one principle.
35
  For example, in 
the Northern Ireland case, the principle of consent was of signal importance to the 
majority unionist community, just as the principle of parity of esteem was of signal 
importance to the minority nationalist community.  Yet when it came to the drafting of 
the 1998 Agreement, the two principles were not only encased within a broader 
framework of common principles, but realisation of the one principle was made to 
depend on realisation of the other.
36
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There is also an issue here of how deep a principled compromise need go.  On the face of 
it, someone might say that principles bring too many other things into play, including 
underlying values and worldviews, which are not amenable to compromise.  But 
principles need not go „all the way down‟.  For example, different religious groups might 
share the same principle of fairness, even though each conceives of that principle as 
grounded in its own religious faith.
37
  Admittedly, in reality the line between public 
principles and private commitments can be hard to draw or to maintain.
38
  Yet that need 
not undermine the case for promoting principled compromise—so long, that is, as the 
international community is careful to ensure that the parties avoid unnecessary conflict in 
characterising what they see as the implications of a given principle.
39
  Alternatively, out 
of a concern for stability, the international community might encourage the parties to 
work from principles whose elaboration is less rather than more likely to give offence, 
leaving contentious issues to a future date when the parties might be better placed to deal 
with them constructively.  
 
There are at least three further reasons to think that principled compromise may be more 
stable (or stable for longer) than strategic compromise.  First, the comparative study of 
internal conflicts suggests that inclusion is crucial to the prospects for political stability.
40
  
For example, it is generally agreed that a successful compromise must include both 
moderates and hard-liners within the institutional structures for governing the state.  
Unless hard-liners are included, they may have no particular incentive to support the 
compromise or to refrain from engaging in „spoiler‟ behaviour.41   While a carefully 
crafted strategic compromise should perform well on this score, a carefully crafted 
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principled compromise might perform even better.  For example, having signed up to the 
principle of exclusively democratic means, a hard-line party that then sought to use the 
threat of a return to violence as a means of strengthening its own hand would need to 
justify, perhaps publicly, why a breach of that principle is justified.  So, while inclusion 
may be necessary for stability, principles can defend a compromise process from the 
dangers of inclusion. 
 
Secondly, internal conflicts affect not just the parties about whom we hear most, but also 
others in society—for example, minority groups that are not directly involved in the 
conflict, individuals who seek to break away from their community of origin or those for 
whom political struggles related to class or gender are of far greater concern than 
religious or ethnic differences.
42
  Those others will not normally have the opportunity to 
participate directly in the compromising process; the leaders of the main conflicting 
parties will usually determine which concessions will be made and on what terms.  Yet 
insofar as a compromise is guided by principles that they can also share, they might not 
feel quite so excluded—for example, if a principle of respect for different ways of life is 
built into the compromise, groups excluded from the compromising process might 
nevertheless embrace the principle and invoke it in their own case. In the short term, that 
may add little to political stability.  But in the longer term, it may aid the process of 
„normalisation‟ by providing a political foot-hold for alternative forms of political 
identity or modes of engagement within the polity.  As such, a principled compromise 
will send out the message that one need not engage politically along ethnic or religious 
lines. 
 
A final (and related) reason why the international community should encourage the 
conflicting parties to build principled compromises rather than strategic compromises is 
because of the form of public reason that principled compromise facilitates.  Insofar as a 
compromise is based on common political principles, and publicly known to be so, 
people may begin to defend their more everyday political preferences in terms of those 
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principles.  What may then result is a virtuous circle—a principled compromise promotes 
principled deliberation, and that principled deliberation in turn reinforces the principled 
compromise.
43
  To begin with the principles may be viewed simply as principles—for 
example, they may be taken to refer to little more than the mechanisms of decision 
making, or the basic weights and measures of resource allocation, and may be accepted 
simply as such by the conflicting parties.  But over time, the principles may take on 
greater political significance—they may come to be seen not just as the common 
currency of political debate, but as an integral part of an emerging political system to 
which everyone shares a sense of allegiance.
44
   
 
Conclusion 
 
Everyone recognises that compromise is ubiquitous in politics and that it is indispensable 
for the conduct of political life.  Politics is said to be the art of the possible and we might 
think that compromise is essential to its being possible.  And yet compromise has 
received remarkably little attention from political philosophers and international political 
theorists.  Our aim in this article has been to dust off the idea of compromise and to see 
what a philosophical analysis of that idea might have to say about internal conflicts.   
 
The international community has many reasons to promote compromise and to end 
internal conflict—not least of all because, in some cases, the only alternative to 
compromise may be violence, state dissolution and even inter-state war.  But to do so 
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effectively, the international community might benefit from a better understanding of the 
idea of compromise and in particular from a better understanding of the two forms a 
compromise might take.  In practice, the distinction between principled and strategic 
compromise may often be hard to draw—actual compromises may well entail some 
indeterminate mixture of the two.  After years of conflict, the contending parties might 
share the goal of creating effective democratic institutions.  But while they might not 
wish to concede any more than is absolutely necessary, they might also think that 
democratic institutions should be fair (e.g., they might think that the parties should be 
represented proportionally in parliament and cabinet).  So, on one level, they might think 
strategically about the compromises that will need to be made in order to achieve their 
goals while, on another level, they might think that any compromise should be guided by 
principle. 
 
Still, as we have argued, the distinction matters.  The principles that underpin a principled 
compromise need not immediately reach to or determine every aspect of a compromise 
between conflicting parties.  Following J.S. Mill, Dennis Thompson argues that, in the 
short term at least, a principled compromise need only „be directed at the “worst features 
of the existing system”‟, or should only apply „where it is “most urgently needed”‟, but 
need not govern the reform of the entire system.
45
  Yet while a principled compromise 
need not be instituted in one go, it should allow us to design political institutions and 
procedures with an eye to the future.  So, whereas a strategic compromise may be more 
attuned to getting things done in the here and now, a principled compromise can be 
broader in aspiration.  Societies marked by internal conflict need all the help they can get.  
Yet if the international community is to play a constructive role in ending the conflict, it 
must first have a clear sense of what a compromise is and the different forms a 
compromise may take. 
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